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# Korean popular music in-between: Identity strategies between Japanese style and American standards in the 1960s

## ABSTRACT

*This article explores collective experiences of Japanese popular music within the post-Second World War South Korean society along with related identity strategies – elimination, stratification and standardization – from postcolonial perspectives and discuss what characterizes ‘Japanese-ness’ as a musical, industrial and social product. In the context of strategies to eradicate it from the urban spaces, cultural industry and memories and bodies of Korean people, Japanese-ness – labelled under the moniker waesaek – was proscribed as a cultural remnant of imperialism, militarism and colonial dominion and thus, a harmful influence on its public. South Korean popular songs categorized as waesaek music within this model were subject to social criticism and gentrified in the music marketplace as trot. On the other hand, Americanization was an important strategy used to construct a new ‘Korean-ness’ separate from the Japanese-ness lingering within the country from its colonial past. Japanese-ness in popular music in post-war South Korea continually changed as it was re-imagined and re-constructed in parallel with musical, social and industrial changes in South Korea. Each of these*

## KEYWORDS

popular music  
postcolonial  
Cold War  
music censorship  
East Asian modernity  
music genre  
enka  
trot

*strategies carries its own corresponding paradoxes, and Korean-ness and Japanese-ness are cast in sharp relief as distinct cultural products while still containing those paradoxes. This article argues that these strategies, both global and local in scope, highlight the fact that post-colonialism cannot be explained merely by the relationship between one colony and one empire but rather evolves in a global and local milieu, in which multiple empires and colonies are intertwined.*

## INTRODUCTION

Japanese popular music – referring to musical styles that formed in Korea from the end of the Second World War through the 1960s – was a product of self-identity construction, in which the public imagined ‘Japanese-ness’ as distinct from the United States even as the Japanese gazed upon their occupier with desire and resistance (Aoki 2013; Yoshimi 2003). Despite the stylistic diversity of popular music over this period – including the rockabilly-influenced songs of Sakamoto Kyu, the sentimental ballads coalescing as the genre of enka, and Beatles-esque small ensembles labelled ‘group sounds’ – they all represented a post-war Japanese-ness established and consumed by both internal forces as well as American and other western cultures (Bourdagh 2012; Wajima 2018).

Emerging along with geopolitical transformations after Japan’s defeat, these forms of Japanese-ness were undoubtedly postcolonial. However, few scholars have paid much attention to how post-war Japanese-ness as expressed in popular music was regarded and imagined in the countries formerly colonized and ruled by Japan until 1945. This focus on illuminating just the gazes of Japan and the western nations to which it aspired has precluded consideration of alternative versions of Japanese-ness constructed amidst the conflicts and paradoxes generated through the desires and gazes of formerly colonized peoples whose identities had been regulated by the colonial dominion of Imperial Japan.

Despite Korea having been colonized by Japan, the presence of Japanese-ness in Korea’s popular music world has received little scholarly attention. There are three plausible reasons for this oversight.

First, because Korean popular music had been shaped by Japanese influences ever since its colonial subjugation in the 1920s, it was impossible for Japanese-ness to be perfectly disentangled from Korean-ness. This caused debates about latent Japanese-ness in Korean music to keep taking the familiar form of ‘enka vs. trot’ (to be discussed below) until the end of the twentieth century (Lee 1994). Second, since the distribution and consumption of Japanese popular music were banned after Korea’s liberation from colonial rule, Japanese-ness was continually viewed through a lens of prohibition, which obscured the full picture of the markets, policies and discourses surrounding Japanese music in Korea. Until the Korean government sanctioned markets for Japanese cultural products – first allowing distribution of popular culture in 1998, followed by popular music recordings in 2004 – Japanese-ness was grounds for political censorship by the state as well as social censorship by a complex interplay of elite, media and public forces (Kwon 2007). Third, the shared experiences of military rule and occupation in the post-war period, which engendered a strong desire for Americanization in both countries, turned Japanese-ness into a multi-layered entity that clashed with its monolithic conceptualization in previous generations (Shin and Ho 2009).

In the process of the construction of Korean-ness, Japanese-ness was treated as not only a colonial relic but also a resource for fusion and imitation under the influence of Americanization. However, only a 'pure' or monolithic Korean identity was emphasized in the dominant mood of nationalism, and as a result, little visibility was given to the multidimensionality of Japanese-ness or the diverse Korean agents who accepted it.

To explain Japanese-ness in Korea in this historical milieu, it is necessary to frame the beliefs and attitudes regulating and positioning it in Korea as identity strategies, which informed the construction of a 'Korean-ness distinct from Japan' in Korean popular music. To that end, this article will focus on the 1960s, which saw the introduction and execution of various identity strategies related to Japanese-ness that would influence modern Korean culture through the late twentieth century.

The 1960s, often portrayed as the decade that witnessed the genesis of Korea's 'cultural modernity', saw the establishment of ambivalent attitudes, perceptions and feelings towards Japanese-ness (Kwon and Cheon 2012). Since systems and industries for cultural commodities such as television broadcasting developed over the same period, such ambivalence was also intrinsic to popular music made in Korea in this era and started to be expressed in various forms (Choi [1984] 1985: 369). Japanese music, as well as popular culture more broadly, remained subject to bans as Korea experienced the upheavals of the April Revolution (1960) and the military coup d'état (1961) and these restrictions continued even after the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965. These prohibitions – caught up in such frames of pro-nation vs. anti-nation, high culture vs. popular culture and older vs. younger generations – meant that Japanese popular culture was excluded from the scope of the Japan-Korea rapprochement. These bans notwithstanding, however, Japanese-ness continued to be accepted, reproduced and problematized in diverse forms through both Japanese music and Korean music (Kim [2014] 2023).

The purpose of this article is to examine the positioning and nature of Japanese-ness as a musical, industrial and social product in 1960s Korea. Japanese-ness was constructed via the dynamism and ambivalence of various discursive strategies in which each of these actors asserted the legitimacy of their own views. This article treats the prohibition, acceptance, reproduction and problematization of Japanese-ness as strategies for framing or expressing identity undertaken by various actors such as the Korean government, mass media, music industry and Korean audiences themselves. These complex strategies, both global and local in scope, highlight the fact that post-colonialism cannot be explained merely by the relationship between one colony and one empire but rather, evolves in a global and local milieu, in which multiple empires and colonies are intertwined.

## **IDENTITY STRATEGIES IN MUSIC**

How did different subjects of Korean society go about constructing boundaries between the self and the other, as well as undertaking related identification work? How was Japanese-ness defined in various contexts, and how were those definitions presented in relation to Korean-ness? To consider these questions, I examine strategies for constructing identities and making cultural differences in the 'in-between spaces' between freedom and subjugation, desires and fears and self and the other.

One of the most vexed questions confronted by emerging independent nations is how to strike a balance between felt material and psychological needs in order to simultaneously modernize while protecting national identity (Calhoun 1997). The process of independence is thus manifested – as argued by Clifford Geertz – not only in formal domains such as legislative assemblies but also in the informal domain of collective consciousness, which greatly influences the direction of people’s lives (Geertz 1973). Desires and fears inhabit this collective consciousness in a variety of forms: people’s desires for independence and modernization related to building a new, advanced nation while resisting empire are accompanied by fears of the dangers of cultural annexation and the risk of identity loss caused by the infiltration of that empire’s culture (Appadurai 1996).

Questions of cultural relations with the Other (especially former rulers) in a postcolonial nation state cannot easily be split cleanly along the lines of domination and resistance or external and internal. Cultural difference marks the establishment of new forms of meaning and strategies of identification (Bhabha 1990: 313). Culture as a strategy of survival, in the view of Homi K. Bhabha, is both transnational and translational. It becomes as much an uncomfortable, disturbing practice of survival and supplementarity – between art and politics, past and present, the public and the private – as its resplendent being is a moment of pleasure, enlightenment or liberation (Bhabha 1994: 247–51). Strategies of identity formation emerge from the interstices between the often contradictory interests and cultural values of its communities – ‘in-between spaces’ teeming with various conflicts and paradoxes between desire and fear (Bhabha 1994: 63–64).

Music is at once an important subject of strategies for identity work, manifesting tactics of ‘othering’, and an important means of building and maintaining social and cultural boundaries (Roy and Dowd 2010: 189–90). Several strategies involving the use of music to self-identify ‘Me’ and self-disidentify ‘Not-Me’ (Killian and Johnson 2006: 65) can be ascertained from research on musical sociology.

The first strategy discussed here is *elimination* via censorship of music and musicians feared to harm self-identity. The production and distribution of music perceived as dangerous or unclean by a national-level community have historically been subject to various types of censorship, to greater and lesser degrees. Censorship with the objective of cultural protection or controlling behaviour of the masses is implemented by a wide range of institutions besides the government: mass media, religious organizations, the music industry, businesses, school systems, distributors, music groups, parents and even individual musicians themselves (Korpe et al. 2006: 239–40). Some forms of censorship directly forbid music’s publication and dissemination; others are indirect, such as burning copies or fanning moral condemnation of consumption of particular musical works. What these forms have in common is their objective of eliminating music or musicians from public spaces, or at least preventing their products spreading beyond small groups of elites to a broader, mass audience (Becker 1982: 186–87).

The second strategy – *stratification* – consists of creating or imagining differences between the self and other by segmenting music by genre as well as related practices and discourse. Musical genre is represented through a variety of relationships among social and cultural boundaries. Efforts to solidify and erode inter-genre boundaries, in the view of William G. Roy, are self-aware cultural projects aimed at deliberately aligning and/or subverting

social boundaries (Roy 2002: 460). Such cultural activities operate at the level of the collective consciousness, as people recognize and perceive a unique ‘ambience’ surrounding music beyond its technical elements and norms. The social and commercial classification of genres can be seen in their stratification. People differentiate music and construct social relations by creating genres and assigning a hierarchy to them (DiMaggio 1987: 447–48). Thus, the repeated definition and redefinition of genres is also a process of negotiation between ‘us-ness’ and ‘other-ness’ (Roy and Dowd 2010: 191–93).

Establishing a style for expressing this us-ness – i.e., *standardization* – is the third strategy discussed here. Both of the identity strategies covered above – whether because they must carve out and remove foreign elements from the self (elimination) or somehow distinguish other from self in a shared environment (stratification) – ultimately beg the same question: ‘What is the nature of that self – who are we?’ The answer crucially informs how communities will deconstruct different types of music, what aspects they will find personally relevant and how the reconstructed music will be stratified within existing hierarchies. Musically speaking, what communicates ‘us-ness’ to listeners is *style*. Styles consist of mannerisms and conventions frequently associated with specific times and places (Rosenblum 1978: 424). The styles established through the mannerisms and customs of a community afford them shared experiences of desire and commonality, through which they develop shared emotional states and assert the self as distinct from the other (Frith 1981: 15–32).

A style starts to regulate communities more rigorously once it is recognized as a *standard*: i.e., once it starts to strictly regulate us-ness as a musical, commercial or cultural norm. Standards can be conceptualized as shared aesthetic norms within social groups, communication formats for musical activities and organizing principles for musical groups (Etzkorn 1982: 562). While they may express musical styles that are personal, selfhood is irrelevant to their use in identity strategies. They are important because – in the forms of ‘standard narratives’ (Leyshon and Matless and Revill 1995: 426) and ‘standard perceptions’ (Botstein 2004: 179) – they hold the power to integrate and unify communities. Standardization, as an identity strategy for constructing the Self, thus necessarily also involves aspects of *de*-construction to disentangle the Other as well as *re*-construction to replace the parts it once occupied.

## IDENTITY STRATEGY #1: ELIMINATION

Korean popular music sprouted in the late 1920s following the release of ‘The Hymn of Death’ (1926), Korea’s first popular song, but its development was shaped by strict censorship by the Japanese government-general of Chosun (Park 1987: 119–38). According to Lee Junhee, nearly 280 records – including 68 Korean-language records – were banned over the ten-year period starting in 1933, when censorship was institutionalized by the Phonograph Record Control Regulations (Lee 2007: 177–80). The rationales cited for banning folk songs such as ‘Arirang’ and ‘Jongno Negeori’ were ‘disturbance of public peace’ and ‘degeneracy of public morals’. Censorship acted to enforce the political legitimacy and authority of colonial power on culture, with popular music censored based not only on its lyrical content but also on the singing style and voice of its artists. The cultural challenge posed to post-liberation Korea was thus to break free from this colonial power by eradicating and eliminating the Japanese-ness internalized in the bodies and living spaces of its people (Yamauchi 2014: 33–38).

Such identity work was simultaneously a decolonization process, influenced by people's antipathy towards and fears of a re-invasion by Japanese imperialism and an extension of nationalistic cultural politics for expressing self-esteem and cultural superiority over Japan, feelings which had smouldered throughout the colonial era (You 1998: 446). Manifestations of Japanese-ness, which was seen as something to be eliminated, were labelled 'waesaek' (왜색; 色倭), which translates as Japanese Style, derived from the word 'wae' historically used on the Korean peninsula with connotations of disdain towards Japan since the thirteenth century (Morisaki 1971: 168–69). Japanese popular songs were regarded as a particular target of efforts to purge waesaek and 'removing Japanese colour from our music' was presented as a way to recover the independent soul of the nation (*The Chosun Ilbo* 1946). The resulting campaign to cleanse popular songs and ballads was promoted by the mass media, government, intellectual elites and music professionals, with the various actors sharing a professed concern that 'the majority of popular music produced in Korea are artifacts, counterfeits, imitations or impostors of Japanese styles' (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1950).

Japanese songs still abound in our city streets; only their lyrics have been changed to our language. Chief among them are lyrics and melodies espousing militarism or so-called 'blues'-style decadence, sung everywhere without abridgement. Nothing could be more pathetic or embarrassing. To address the problem, officials at the Education Ministry's Correctional Department are preparing to define standards for refined and innovative music, with an emphasis on musical education; meanwhile, the Police Ministry has decided to crack down harshly and instruct the police agencies in every jurisdiction to purge these vulgar songs from theatres, cafes and musical instrument stores without exception.

(*The Dong-a Ilbo* 1946: 2)

Waesaek music was subject to prohibition throughout the Rhee Syngman administration (1948–60) – South Korea's first government after the war, which espoused anti-communist and anti-Japanese positions – when it was designated as decadent, vulgar and harmful to the people's sanity. Not only were the distribution and sale of Japanese records banned, but the acts of possessing such records or playing Japanese songs in commercial areas or cafes were also subject to police crackdowns. 'Refrain from Japanese Songs' – a government opinion piece published in February 1951 at the height of the Korean War (15 June 1950–27 July 1953) – clearly illustrates how waesaek music's infiltration was perceived as a matter of protecting the Korean people and their culture (*The Chosun Ilbo* 1951). In parallel with sponsoring campaigns to eradicate waesaek music as well as awareness campaigns such as the 'Wipe Out Waesaek Song Seminar' (*The Chosun Ilbo* 1956), the government pursued their goal through content censorship. Up until the late 1950s, anti-Japaneseism in its cultural context served as the main pretext for censorship, even more so than anti-communism (Lee 2008: 28).

Despite these efforts at eradication via censorship and public campaigns, Japanese popular songs increasingly flowed into Korea in the 1960s as the market for music expanded. In particular, following the 1960 April Revolution that overthrew Rhee Syngman's government, much of the public (of all ages) evinced a receptiveness to Japanese music as a medium of 'cultural modernity', together with products of American popular culture (Kwon and Cheon 2012: 515–16). In what has been referred to as the 'Japan boom', the market



was saturated with imitations of Japanese music, sparking a societal discussion (*The Dong-a Ilbo* 1960c).

The Park Chung-hee administration (1963–79), which came to power in a military coup in 1961, attempted to promote the normalization of South Korea–Japan relations while acknowledging public anti-Japanese sentiment (Kwon and Cheon 2012: 544–46). To strike this balance, the regime shifted waesaek restrictions from outright bans to cultural and social censorship and surveillance while deliberately distinguishing popular music and other cultural relations between the two countries from the primarily economic and strategic focus of the new South Korea–Japan relationship. Their policies would spawn the ‘Waesae Model’, in which laws governing media and mass culture were mixed with conventions related to Japanese-influenced music. Semantic drift further complicated the censorship of ‘waesaek music’: while the term primarily referred to Japanese popular songs through the 1950s, its use gradually expanded to include Korean popular songs that imitated Japanese styles.

Efforts to construct the Waesaek Model began in earnest in 1965, when diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan were normalized. Starting this year, songs’ suitability for broadcasting was reviewed by the newly established Song Advisory Committee, under the control of the Korean Broadcasting Ethics Committee. Prohibitions on Japanese-influenced music were thus incorporated into a broader system for the censorship of mass music generally. In 1965, broadcasting bans were ordered for 115 Korean pop songs: eighteen of these were banned for being waesaek, compared with 79 for being written by lyricists who had crossed over to North Korea, fourteen for being degenerate and vulgar and four for plagiarism. In total, 247 of the 787 songs banned by the committee from 1965 to 1981 were waesaek-related. On the grounds that they were ‘Japanese-coloured songs’ or ‘Japanese-coloured singing’, songs by prominent Korean singers such as Nam Jin’s ‘Ballad in Mokpo’, Na Hoon’s ‘A Foolish Man’ and Ha Chunhwa’s ‘Sad Love’ were banned (Broadcasting Ethics Committee 1981: 28–45).

‘Camellia Girl’ (‘Dongbaeg-agassi’), a song portrayed as epitomizing the Waesaek Model, was released in 1964 by Lee Miya, an iconic singer in the world of Korean popular music in the 1960s. The song was a popular hit and its inclusion on the ‘banned’ list due to its designation as waesaek was symbolic of the expanding scope of censorship in Korea, extending beyond merely eliminating Japanese songs to the attempted erasure of Japanese influence from Korean songs. Seeking to eliminate other-ness from us-ness in popular music was a messy proposition, but was nonetheless used to justify government censorship. This was simultaneously accompanied by emotional ambivalence, with desires for modernization expected to result from the normalization of South Korea–Japan relations conflicting with fears of Japanese re-invasion in both economic and cultural senses. If Korean identity work from independence to the 1950s had primarily aimed to protect the spirit of the nation by eliminating the colonial remnant of waesaek culture, this newly emergent movement sought further to protect domestic industry from ‘lascivious and vulgar cultural aggression’ (Shin 1964: 59).

## IDENTITY STRATEGY #2: STRATIFICATION

The diversifying preferences of the public were explosively manifested in Korea’s music market after 1960, when the April Revolution brought an end to the dictatorship of Rhee Syngman. Despite the attempted suppression

of 'Japanese' cultural products during the 1950s, there was still a persistent, constant demand for Japanese pop music as well as Korean pop music of a similar style – a demand that did not go unnoticed by the media or marketplace. Despite the continuous barrage of rebukes against waesaek culture, apprehension about the effects of Japanese capital inflows, and criticisms of consumerism and hedonism, popular demand for 'Japanese'-style music and popular culture persisted (Kim 2007: 359).

The smuggling and copying Japanese records, sale of pirated copies and use of sound sources (playing in stores) increased to the point that the Korean Record Writers Association and Singers' Association released a formal appeal complaining of the damage caused (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1960). The first-ever government-conducted public-opinion poll on national broadcasting, conducted by the Broadcasting Control Bureau of the Public Relations Department, found that 7.3 per cent of Korea listened to Japanese radio broadcasts. This figure was double the 3.9 per cent of listeners to the American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) broadcast via the US military and over triple the 2.3 per cent of listeners to Voice of America (*The Dong-a Ilbo* 1960a). Such trends prompted a growing chorus of voices calling not for 'the coercive and self-righteous crackdowns of the 1950s, but higher-dimensional, instructive cultural policies' (*The Dong-a Ilbo* 1960b: 4).

In parallel, there were attempts by the cultural authorities to determine and categorize which people were producing, distributing and consuming Japanese and Japanese-influenced popular music. Generations in their 40s and older who had experienced the colonial era first-hand were identified as a major audience of waesaek popular song: this was a representative trait that distinguished them from younger generations who enjoyed rock-and-roll and jazz (*The Dong-a Ilbo* 1960d). Segmenting consumption categories in this way once again confirmed that waesaek issues were, in fact, postcolonial issues. The production and consumption of Japanese-influenced songs were similarly regarded as a problem in the music industry. Directly after the normalization of South Korea–Japan relations, for example, music programme staff at five domestic radio stations began a search for waesaek songs having a 'corrupting influence on public information', classifying them by song title, songwriter, composer and singer based on criteria of lyrics, melos, rhythm, singing technique and even 'grace' (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1965). Diverse practices and discourses surrounding musical culture and musical censorship thus acted to categorize who was making, distributing and enjoying waesaek music, and led to it becoming perceived as a single, broad, coherent genre.

'Camellia Girl' and other popular songs criticized and censored as waesaek at the time were classified as trot, a genre newly designated in the 1960s. This name originated from foxtrot, the dance and musical style introduced in the United States in the 1910s, which later spread around the world in parallel with tango, waltz and other dances. Eventually reaching Japan in its 'dance boom' of the 1920s, fokkusu-torotto (foxtrot) referred to music translated from western popular songs with underlying jazz rhythms and harmonies (Mori 2016). In the 1930s, popular song formats in which local Korean music was fused with western jazz-style popular songs through Japan and Japanese-style popular songs took root on the Korean peninsula (Zhang 2006: 124–29). It became a genre in the 1960s to refer to them as 'trot'. As demonstrated by the example of 'Camellia Girl', the terms 'waesaek songs' and 'trot' came to be used interchangeably. 'Trot' eventually came to refer to popular music that was brought to Korea from Japan during the colonial era.



Trot's metamorphosis into a significant genre and strategy for revitalizing the music business was thus accompanied by countervailing pressure from the political realm and Korea's (self-appointed) cultural gatekeepers. Around 1967, after the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea, the term 'trot' first appeared in Korean newspapers as a musical style, referring to 'a music genre that is selling well in the market despite the waesaek controversy' (The *Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1967a: 8). The standards for determining what constituted waesaek were, however, ambiguous. A common justification for the prohibition was 'Yonanuki scale', while other justifications included 'waesaek song', 'waesaek lyric', 'vulgar singing style and waesaek', 'vulgar lyrics and waesaek' and 'waesaek accompaniment' (Broadcasting Ethics Committee 1981: 7–79). It was impossible solely to extract the 'Japanese' elements from trot because the genre had not only been influenced by Japanese musical fashions but had evolved in the Korean cultural context. Furthermore, while the logic of 'protecting national identity' was invoked to justify criticism of waesaek songs, on the other hand, a supercilious dismissiveness towards music listened to primarily by the 'masses', the less educated and the rural population was also at work (Lee 2006: 69; Zhang 2008: 67–68), indicating the tensions and ambivalence surrounding the 'waesaek' phenomenon.

Genre-based stratification is strikingly apparent from Lee Mija's activities in Japan. Lee Mija was the very first Korean singer to visit Japan after the normalization of diplomatic relations. In 1966, her 'Camellia Girl' was translated and released in Japan by JVC as *Koi no akai akari* ('Red light of love'). However, some unfavourable criticism of her songs also existed within Korea since the 'Korean-ness' they represented was perceived as something similar to Japanese enka, with Japanese media noting her appellation as 'The Hibari Misora of Korea' (The *Maeil Kyungjae* 1966). Despite the sizeable market share enjoyed by trot in Korea – 'Camellia Girl' was actually Lee Mija's most successful post-war release there – it was nonetheless considered a waesaek analogue of enka and thus targeted for stratification.

Stratification heralded a major shift in the nature of prohibitions on Japanese music in Korea: instead of removing and eliminating all forms of popular music of Japanese origin, authorities moved to reject and repudiate specific, similar genres present in both countries. Waesaek was reminiscent of Japanese pop songs from before the war and thus entangled with collective, colonial-era memories shared throughout Korean society. However, when non-enka genre songs became more prevalent in the 1960s, more Japanese songs emerged that defied the notion of 'waesaek' as it was then described. Sukiyaki, which peaked at number one on the Billboard Hot 100 in 1963, stood out among them. Sukiyaki was made and distributed in eight locations in 1963 (The *Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1963). This song was first broadcast on US military radio as a Billboard top single and it has since been consumed and made available in a variety of ways, including covers with lyrics in Korean sung by South Korean singers, copies boasting 'Japan-US Collaborations', pirated versions of the original Japanese song (The *Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1964).

While Japanese, some songs have relatively moral melodies and contents, such as 'Ue o muite arukō' now being sung fondly around the globe. For songs of this calibre, it shouldn't be a problem to sing them together with other foreign songs.

(The *Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1964: 8)

Essentially, grouping the trot genre along with enka and similar waesaek songs caused changes in public opinion: Lee Mija's songs – written in Korea and sung in Korean – were perceived as waesaek popular music, whereas Sakamoto Kyu's songs – written in Japan with Japanese lyrics – were regarded as Japanese popular music distinct from waesaek. This switch in attitudes brought about by genre-fiction and stratification caused Japanese-ness to be split into 'Japanese pop', which resembled global, universal music and 'waesaek music', in which the country's traditionalism and uniqueness were emphasized. This split would be reflected in Korean pop music as well: Japanese popular music – which shared a universality with other pop music in the expanding music industry and market – was distinguished from cultural manifestations of Japanese-ness, perceived as requiring elimination from Korean popular music and culture.

This stratification was intended to simultaneously promote 'the modernity process' (Tomlinson 1991) and 'the work of creating boundaries with the other' (Edensor 2002). But this strategy also manifested a paradox created by the collision of the twin challenges of modernization and decolonization. Both enka and trot had been labelled and stratified as waesaek, with Korean relationships to these genres formed in postcolonial musical spaces coloured by colonial-era experiences and memories. Yet Sakamoto Kyu's songs were consumed in a different, 'in-between' musical space between Japanese music and waesaek, which was influenced less by the country's historical animosity than by their new alliance in 1965 and a shared emphasis on Americanism and economic development. What was essential to this strategy (and paradox) ultimately boiled down to perceptions of selfhood: i.e., what made a musical style 'Korean'?

### **IDENTITY STRATEGY #3: STANDARDIZATION**

The 1950s and 1960s were a period of broad social change on the Korean peninsula. Politically, the country experienced the April Revolution and military coup d'état in rapid succession; economically, it started down the path to an industrialized society; and culturally, mass culture and daily lifestyles were reconfigured into a new, modern format which visualized the diverse desires of a society driven by personal preferences. This re-composition evolved along with political and cultural homogenization along the lines of American hegemony, centred around the US military bases occupying South Korea after Japan's defeat in 1945. Just as Korea's modern culture of the colonial era can be viewed as having replicated a Japanized form of contemporary western lifestyles, its modern culture of the post-war era can be framed as representing a transition 'from Japanese empire to American empire', in which American lifestyle was directly imitated and transplanted (Kim 2007). In this context, Korean cultural elites raised concerns about the overwhelming influx of Japanese popular culture, viewing it as a significant issue within Korean society. They perceived this phenomenon as indicative of cultural subordination to foreign countries and a manifestation of unsophisticated cultural preferences amongst the untutored 'masses' (Kim 2007: 348).

Likewise, popular music was commercialized in a form that mixed Japanese-ness and American-ness. Postcolonial efforts to eliminate Japanese-ness posited a binary-oppositional relationship of 'Japanese-ness vs. American-ness'. However, as seen from the genre-fiction of trot, the project of completely eliminating Japanese-ness ultimately did not succeed because

those popular songs labelled *waesaek*, musically speaking, did not embody a Japanese specificity but rather a 'Japanized Western' popular musical style. As Christopher Small noted, western-style popular music tends to be less concerned with notions of correctness and is thus able to absorb into itself elements of traditional ways of music-making, which the middle classes, in their eagerness to align themselves with the international industrial culture, reject, even though at the same time they may pay lip service to them. This happened in South Korea in the 1960s (Small 1998: 37).

Despite this, in the national dimension, the strategic direction of 'Americanization' clearly overlapped with a desire to cast off Japanese-ness as a remnant of the colonial era and a desire to pursue western styles in order to become part of the global music industry. As can be seen from this excerpted article from the *Sasanggae*, an intellectual magazine typical of the time, the commingling of Japanese-ness and American-ness led to the formation of a modern Korean cultural structure through the lens of 'negative' culture and 'positive' culture.

Let us compare Japanese-ness and American-ness in Korea today. Given the long time of the past and the geographic and linguistic conditions of the present, Japanese-ness is more deeply etched on us despite being negative: whereas American-ness – even assuming it to be positive and (at least to external appearances) superior, and acknowledging it to have started to infiltrate aspects of our lives – is not as deeply rooted here in cultural respects.

(Lee 1964: 86)

Likewise, in the music industry and youth music culture, American styles were seen as a way to cast off Japanese styles and create modern popular music. One symbolic event in this regard happened in 1957, when a survey found that 'waesaek popular music and jazz made up 90% of record sales' (*The Chosun Ilbo* 1957b: 2). The Popular Musicians' Association sparked a debate in the music industry by proposing the "jazzification" of folk music: to incorporate styles such as chaconne, mambo and jazz into national folk music and create a Korean style that matches the customs and tastes of the public' (*The Chosun Ilbo* 1957a: 4; *The Dong-a Ilbo* 1957: 4).

US military bases occupying the capital Seoul were an especially important mediator of American media and popular culture in urban spaces on a daily basis. The introduction of US broadcast management systems to the country over the USAMGIK period from 1945 to 1948 (United States Army Military Government in Korea) would lead South Korean broadcasting to adopt standards of American technology and equipment, and South Korean radio programming to be based on American scheduling and policy principles (Kang 1997). The nationwide network built by AFKN – a branch of the global broadcasting network of the US military (Armed Forces Radio and Television Service: AFRTS) – started television broadcasts in 1957. Five years later, in 1962, a survey would find that the public spent one hour 22 minutes watching English-language AFKN-TV programming on average: this amounted to half of the two hours 49 minutes spent viewing the Korean Broadcast System (KBS), a Korean-language station launched in 1961 (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1962).

The income paid to the musicians and their managers who worked for the camp shows amounted to 1 million US dollars, which exceeded the total

export revenue in the 1950s (Shin and Ho 2009: 93). These bases and their broadcasts functioned as urban media spaces for disseminating American styles of music and systems of entertainment, as well as promoting the Korean musicians who adopted them. These spaces allowed youth and middle-class audiences to consume American popular music in almost real time, from the boogie-woogie fad to the rockabilly boom: these same audiences were crazy about American-style 'Korean pop' by South Korean singers originating from USO Camp Shows.

Both mass media and the music industry valued the explosive popularity of American pop as a way to modernize Korean popular songs while preventing infiltration by 'corrupting waesaek music' (*The Dong-a Ilbo* 1960b: 4). The songs and public image of singers like Patti Kim, a contemporary of Lee Mija and top diva whose career was launched by USO Camp Shows, were embraced as forces for purifying the world of Korean popular song, portrayed as tinged with 'vulgar and Japanese-imbued tunes' (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1966: 5). This new direction – which attempted to establish Korean pop style by distancing it from Japanese styles through adoption of American ones – actually influenced the people creating music as well. For musicians who wanted to write 'Korean pop' adjacent to American-ness, trot signified a form of 'old music' to be cast away, as can be discerned from the remarks of famous composer Lee Bongjo: 'I rejected the Japanese colour of trot and composed songs in the tango style' (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1967a: 8, 1967b). Such remarks allude to formal shifts underway in the musical, commercial and cultural standards of Korean popular music during the 1960s, from Japanese styles to American styles.

Paradoxically, five of Lee Bongjo's works were banned for plagiarizing Japanese songs in the 1960s: 'Neoguriajeossi' ('Mr. Neoguri') sung by Choi Hee-jun, 'Du saram' ('Two People'), 'Baram' ('Wind') and 'Yeonaesodong' ('Romantic Circus') by Hyun Mi and 'Sarangi yeolsoe' ('The Key to Love') sung by Jung Hoon-Hee were allegedly lifted verbatim from Japanese songs like 'Blue Chateau', 'Koyubi no omoide' ('Memories of Little Fingers') and 'Fusetsu' ('Snowstorm') (Broadcasting Ethics Committee 1981: 8–50). These examples do not simply demonstrate how dishonest and hypocritical Lee Bongjo and other Korean composers of the era were. Instead, this demonstrates that being affected by increasingly Americanized Japanese musical styles was a necessary step in the process of casting off 'colonial' Japanese-ness and seeking Americanization in order to create a new standard of Korean-ness. That is, South Korean music's Americanization cannot be fully explained in terms of decolonization from Japan. This transformation occurred within a broader framework of accepting the 'American world-view' during the Cold War from a position as a 'Third World' developing nation (Hall 1991).

## CONCLUSION

Japanese-ness in popular music in post-war Japan was not static; it continually transformed. Similarly, Japanese-ness in popular music in post-war South Korea continually changed as it was re-imagined and re-constructed in parallel with musical, social and industrial changes in South Korea. Japan's diverse other-ness – as a former colonizer, as a neighbouring economic power, and a Cold War ally – and evolving South Korea–Japan relations also acted as important elements. Legal, political and cultural strategies to challenge Japanese influence reflected desires and fears shared across South Korean

society, inventing something that produced a Korean self-identity as well as constructing boundaries between the two nations and their cultures.

In the context of strategies to eradicate it from urban spaces, the cultural industry and popular consciousness, Japanese-ness – labelled under the moniker ‘waesaek’ – was proscribed as a cultural remnant of imperialism, militarism and colonial dominion. However, the concept was entangled with the inevitably cross-border and hybridized nature of popular music, persistent demand for Japanese popular songs and changes in political and economic relations due to diplomatic normalization. Outright bans would give way to the ‘Waesaek Model’, in which Japanese popular music within the country was subject to legalistic, social and musical censorship and surveillance.

South Korean popular songs categorized as waesaek music within this model were subject to social criticism and gentrified in the music marketplace as trot. Japanese-ness was thus portrayed as a characteristic of cruder forms of popular music, framed as vulgar, corrupt and symbolic of cultural subordination and re-invasion. On the other hand, the same quality was recognized in both immoral ‘waesaek music’ and moral ‘Japanese pop’, opening the door for public perceptions and sentiments to diversify along the lines of the musically universal and the specifically Japanese. The growth of the music industry and the expanding market for popular music caused attitudes of unconditional repudiation of Japanese-ness to be replaced by ones of preference-based segmentation (stratification). The resulting ‘Korea–Japan musical space’ was newly constructed by commercial and cultural mechanisms, which cannot be completely explained in terms of postcolonial sentiments alone.

One method pursued in attempts to standardize Korean-ness was Americanization: i.e., borrowing American culture to construct a new Korean-ness separate from the Japanese-ness lingering within the country from its colonial past. This strategy was a manifestation of a cultural desire to enter the international world as a modern people of an independent nation and involved embodying the American world-view broadcast from US military bases and increasingly pervasive in urban society. The American-style music that became mainstream in the music industry was not simply a product of pure Americanization but rather a negotiated product of complex entanglements of diverse desires and fears about Self and Other in the in-between spaces of two empires.

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